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The European economics profession is currently in the process of changing the 
incentives in its research environment to more closely mimic the US economics 
profession so that it can perform better globally. This has led to the development and 
increased reliance on quantitative metrics based on “quality”-weighted journal articles 
and citation measures, such as the Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003) metric. 
Many top European economists are advocating that these measures be used for funding, 
promotion, and advancement decisions within the E.U., so that the E.U. economics 
profession can compete in the global economics profession.
1As these new global metrics 
become built into the European institutional incentive structure, they are changing the 
nature of European economics.  
This paper argues that the almost unidimensional focus on the quality-weighted 
journal article rankings and citations, which is advocated by “global” European 
economists, is misguided.
2 It further argues that, if used, these metrics will likely 
undermine the traditional European economics profession’s strengths and will hamper 
European economics’ development into a true global economics power. The paper 
suggests a set of alternative metrics that build on the traditional European economics 
profession’s strengths. It argues that the use of these alternative metrics will put European 
economics in a position to leapfrog the U.S. economics profession in the coming 
decades.
3  
Formal and Informal Rankings  
Rankings happen. Informally, economists rank other economists and programs all 
the time—this is a good program; this is a bad one; this is an economist who has 
something to say; this is one who does not. It is only natural that these informal rankings 
get formalized. The questions posed in this paper are: how formal does one want to make 
these rankings, and how much attention should the economics profession pay to them? I 
argue: not very, and not much.  
The economics-ranking sub-industry developed in the United States in the 1970s. 
Initially, rankings were not given significant prominence in funding or research, and top 
U.S. economists and economic programs paid little attention to it. The rankings attracted 
                                                 
1 A subset of European schools has already become “globalized;” they use these measures internally for 
hiring and promotion decisions. A majority of programs have not; they remain more traditionally 
European, but they are feeling strong pressure to become “globalized” as well. 
2 See, for instance, Kirman and Dahl (1994), Dreze (2001), and Neary, Mirrlees, and Tirole (2003). 
3 The arguments in this paper are based in part on a survey and interviews I have done with European 
graduate students and European economists in preparation for an article (Colander 2008) and two books 
that I am working on, The Making of a Global European Economist (2009) and The Changing Face of 
European Economics (together with Ric Holt and Barkley Rosser) (2009)).  
  1most interest among non-top-tier programs that wanted to build their programs up to 
become top-tier, and thought they could do it by hiring and promoting people who scored 
highly in the rankings. Thus, over time, the formal rankings of programs, and of 
economists, became used in U.S. economics programs for promotion decisions, 
especially at second-tier programs.
4 Most top economists that I talk to still do not take 
these rankings too seriously; they make their own decisions about who is a good 
economist and which is a good program. The rankings are certainly not something that 
the AEA even implicitly endorses in the way that the EEA has done.
5
Given this dismissive attitude by top U.S. economists of rankings, as I turned my 
interest to European economics in the early 2000s, I was surprised by the strong reliance 
on quantitative metrics of quality-weighted journal article output that seemed to 
characterize my discussions with top global European economists, and with the current 
reforms in European economics. I argue that this concern and focus are misplaced, both 
because the quantitative measures being used don’t measure full output of economists, 
and because they don’t provide a meaningful measure of future innovative cutting-edge 
research output, which is the type of research that can move programs into the top 
globally-ranked set of schools.  
While these top European economists advocating the use of the journal article 
metrics recognize the problems with formal quantitative rankings, they defend them by 
arguing that the need to change the institutional structure of traditional European 
programs is worth the costs the rankings would impose. Their goal is to make Europe 
competitive with U.S. economics, and they feel that the lack of pressure to do research in 
traditional European programs makes that impossible. They argue that introducing 
quantitative measures of research, and basing funding on those admittedly imperfect 
measures, would increase the pressure to do quality research and should be implemented. 
The argument in this paper is that the changes being imposed will likely backfire, 
and are unlikely to help European economics compete. While I agree that the traditional 
European academic economics profession needs a serious shakeup, the ranking metrics 
being suggested for funding and advancement are not the way to do it. Specifically, much 
                                                 
4 Top-tier programs tended to give far less weight to these rankings. In their view, good work leads to high 
rankings, not the other way around. The sense I get from economists at top programs is that if you have to 
think about rankings, then you probably don’t have a truly top program. Few funding decisions in the 
United States are directly tied to these rankings although’ informally, rankings are used to justify funding 
requests. Where faculty unions exist, these formal rankings have been highly formalized and embedded 
in formal promotion procedures. At most non-union schools rankings of an economist’s journal articles 
are just informally used, but they are nonetheless important.  
5 In 1989, I reviewed much of the recent literature on ranking of U.S. departments for the AEA’s Journal of 
Economic Perspectives. In that article I expressed a view that was shared by the top economists I spoke 
with, and suggested that “the ranking game has been beat to death.” (Colander 1989, 141) I wrote: 
“Everyone knows that any ranking loses important dimensions and, among those active in the profession, 
the information about which schools rank where is known more precisely than the rankings disclose, 
especially in view of how quickly top individuals move from school to school and how quickly topics 
considered important change. (ibid.) Another recent survey of rankings in the U.S. came to a similar 
conclusion. It found that changes in rankings methods do not change significantly the top schools, but can 
change significantly at the medium- and lower-ranked schools. (Thursby, 2000) Thursby writes, “There’s 
not a hill of beans difference across large groups of departments.” (p. 383)  
  2more consideration has to be given to the limits of rankings than seems to have been 
given. In the absence of that consideration, the introduction of formal rankings into 
promotion and advancement decisions will be counterproductive. It will turn European 
universities into a set of perpetual second-tier global programs, like the perpetual second-
tier U.S. programs, rather than turning European programs into serious competitors for 
dominance of global economics.
6  
Full Output Ranking Metrics 
In theory, appropriate formal quantitative rankings can be used in promotion and 
funding decisions. In practice, because of principal-agent problems, (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom 1991) it is not clear whether it can or not. The problem is that the appropriate 
formal rankings would be quite different than the existing rankings being discussed in 
Europe; they would have to be what I call a “full output metric.” Anything less than full 
output metrics will bias activity away from non- or under-measured output that often 
makes up a large percentage of cutting-edge research activities likely to change the 
profession in the future.  
Were formal research output rankings the only way to gather information about 
economists’ output, the problems associated with the use of output rankings would be 
unavoidable. But they are not. As I will argue below, the economics profession’s 
activities are informationally small activities, where informal knowledge that active 
economists have of other active economists’ work provides a better measure of an 
economist’s and a program’s output than will any formal ranking. You know who 
responds to your paper in an e-mail with insightful comments; you know who made an 
important point at a workshop. You know which program has people working on outside-
the-box research that isn’t showing up in the ranking metrics.
7 You know who is working 
on a potentially major innovation in theory or in econometrics. You know who has 
written a paper that is insightful, but never got around to publishing it, or who published 
it in an obscure journal. Thus, for example, the fact that Bill Vickrey published most of 
his papers in obscure journals did not stop the profession from recognizing his 
contribution with a Nobel Prize.  
My point is that for informationally small activities, such as research in 
economics, formal ranking studies add little to the understanding of active professionals 
of other professionals’ work in an operative way; they are far too imprecise for that. The 
measures simply create quantitative metrics that either ratify previously held views, or, if 
the rankings don’t match one’s prior, lead one to look for problems in the formal 
rankings. “In-the-know” economists’ informal ranking supersedes any formal ranking. 
There is obviously an interaction, and I am not arguing that formal rankings are useless. 
                                                 
6 For all the push by various non-top-tier U.S. programs to improve in the rankings, there has been little 
shift over the years in the overall rankings of programs; no program has moved into the top group that 
was not close to the top group initially. The problem is that when a star or group of stars develops at 
lower-ranked programs, they are hired away by the higher-ranked, more prestigious, and generally 
wealthier programs. 
7 Cal Tech in the United States is an example. It ranks much higher in many top economists’ rankings than 
it ranks in the standard ranking metrics. 
  3Formal rankings can be used to refine one’s informal rankings, but my claim is that the 
information in economists’ informal rankings far exceeds the information in formal 
rankings.  
What Is Economists’ Output? 
Let me now consider what the standard journal article ranking metrics miss in 
measuring economists’ output. Most U.S. universities specify economists’ output as 
involving three components: research, teaching, and service.
8 Any meaningful ranking of 
economists’ output must appropriately capture and weight all these elements.  
Most U.S. universities (at least those without faculty unions) leave open the 
relative importance of each of these measures in promotion decisions, in part because the 
department’s weights that are used in decisions on promotion and tenure generally differ 
from the funder’s implicit weights, especially in public universities, which are in large 
part government-funded. (It is an open secret in the United States that universities 
transfer toward research those resources given by funding agencies for teaching.) There is 
usually some wording in most university by-laws that all three elements contribute to 
promotion decisions, but in most U.S. graduate economics departments, the sense I get 
from talking to economists is that about 95% of the weight is placed on research and 5% 
on teaching and service.
9  
Actually, teaching plays a more important role in U.S. economics departments 
than the 95%/5% split would suggest. While it may not be given much weight in the 
formal decision, at many graduate schools economists’ workmanship ethic, and their 
desire to be seen as good in all aspects of their job, leads professors to spend significant 
time on teaching—far in excess of what recognition it might provide them in the 
advancement process. Thus, if I had to hazard a guess about the average time spent by 
economics faculties at the top 50 universities on the various activities, it would be 50% 
teaching, 80% research, and 20% service, with much of the service coming from post-
tenure faculty who have gone into government and university administration positions. 
(This adds up to more than 100% because most U.S. economists believe that they are 
putting in more than 100% effort.) Normalizing this effort to 100%, I arrive at a relative 
weighting of 33% teaching, 53% research (of which 80% of research effort or 42% of 
total effort is for journal article publication), and 13% service for U.S. economists, a 
weighting reflecting the true allocation of U.S. economists’ time. So, for most U.S. 
economists, a ranking based on journal article research is capturing less than half of what 
they would see as their output.  
                                                 
8 Each of these sub-elements of output can include many dimensions. The most ambiguous of these three is 
service, but it general includes activities both within the economics profession and within the broader 
academic and societal community. Government, central bank, international government agency, business, 
and think tank economists have an even broader concept of output, and their output measure would 
significantly expand the areas that would fall under the service heading. Their service includes providing 
advice to policy makers, weighing in on public and internal debates and policy issues by writing policy 
briefs, and talking with, and influencing, policy makers and the general public.  
9 Where I teach, which is a liberal arts school with only undergraduates, the implicit sense I have is that 
after an initial high level of teaching threshold is passed, 50% of the promotion decision depends on 
research, 40% on teaching, and 10% on service. 
  4  In traditional European universities, incentives have been quite different. As 
pointed out by Frey and Eichenberger (1992, 1993) there are two major differences. First, 
the non-journal article aspect of research gets far more importance in Europe; far less 
emphasis goes into preparing research for top-ranked journals. Second, in Europe, service 
is considered not only at the department and university level, but also at the national 
level; in Europe there has been a strong tradition of professors playing active formal and 
informal roles in advising governments and in public debates. They argue that compared 
to U.S. economists, a larger percentage of European economists play the role of public 
intellectual and weigh in on public debates about policy issues.  
 
  In my view, contributing to the public debate is an important output of 
economics—it brings economic knowledge to policy.  Frey and Eichenberg’s argument 
that European economists do more of that is consistent with the incentives they face; such 
output is more likely to “count” in Europe, and can lead to advancement much more than 
is the case in the United States. My sense is that, until recently, in traditional European 
programs, the attitude was that if one published in an international journal--fine, but such 
activity was only one measure of many that lead to advancement in the European context. 
That means that European economists naturally focus less on publishing in international 
journals even if the economists in Europe are doing research that may be highly 
publishable in those journals.  
My point is that these different incentives also lead to a different allocation of 
time in U.S. and global European programs and traditional European programs. 
Assuming the same 20% division of time that I gave to U.S. economists for department 
and university service, and adding another 10% for state-level service, I would estimate 
that 30% of European economists’ time goes to service. Frey also states that 
undergraduate teaching is more important in Europe, but to be conservative, let’s say that 
it is the same 50% input that I estimated for U.S. economists. Research ranks lower in 
traditional European programs than it does in the United States. Just to put some estimate 
on it, say that research generally gets 30% of their time, and that 60% of that research 
goes toward journal-article publication. Adding these together gives a total of 110%, the 
lower total amount reflecting the lower incentives for work of all kinds in Europe as 
compared to the United States. Normalizing to 100% gives relative time spent of 45% for 
teaching, 28% for research, of which 60% or 17% is for journal-article publication and 
28% for service. The numbers used in these calculations are obviously debatable, but the 
point they make is not: these differential incentives in the U.S. and traditional European 
programs make any comparison of traditional European programs and U.S. programs 
highly questionable. That point holds for any reasonable choice of percentage allocation 
of time in Europe and the U.S.  
If my estimates of the differential incentives for the U.S. and traditional European 
programs are close to correct, this suggests that lower effort accounts for only 27% of the 
lower journal-article research output in Europe, and that almost 75% of the difference is 
simply a reflection of the differential incentive structure. By that I mean that these 
journal-article metrics are comparing 17% of traditional European economists’ output 
with 42% of U.S. economists’ output, which makes it a bit like comparing European 
football players with U.S. football players on the basis of their ability to pass, receive, 
  5and block a U.S. football. If one did a full measure of output, this argument would 
suggest that there is much more parity between the traditional European and U.S. 
economics professions than these ranking studies have suggested, and that they present a 
far less distressing picture than the commentators and advocates of a change in metrics 
suggest.
10  
What Is Economist’s Research Output? 
My argument against the journal-article metric is even stronger than that these 
metrics do not measure economists’ full output. It is that they also don’t measure 
economists’ research output in an especially meaningful way. The reason they don’t is 
that research output is a multidimensional concept, and journal-article output measures 
only a small part of the total; thus it biases the research done to emphasize that particular 
dimension. Research includes working on an idea in one’s mind, taking part in an on-line 
debate, developing new ideas, writing a book, taking part in a workshop, commenting on 
a paper, editing a journal, refereeing, or developing some idea within a business. When 
Fisher Black worked on macroeconomic theory and the lack of a pricing anchor in an 
economy with advanced financial markets while at Goldman Sachs, or when Hal Varian 
worked on search algorithms while at Google, they were doing seminal research but little 
of it led to journal-article publication. Similarly, work by economists at YahooResearch 
doesn’t get published. But that work influences ideas, real world policies, and discussions 
within economics.  
Another dimension of research involves its purpose. Theoretical research is that 
part of research that best fits the journal-article outlets. But the majority of economists do 
not do theoretical research; they do applied research, which is meant to influence policy. 
By focusing the output metric on journal articles, economists are led to focus on what 
elsewhere I have called “hands-off” applied research, which I contrast with “hands-on” 
applied research.
11 Hands-off policy analysis is written for other economists or advisors 
to policy makers more than it is written for policy makers. To the degree the analysis 
actually comes to policy conclusions (generally it concludes with a call for more 
research), those conclusions are highly contingent on the implicit value judgments and 
goals in the models. If the policy maker accepts these value judgments and goals, and if 
the world works like the model, then the policy recommendations of the hand-s off 
research are relevant, but the hands-off research papers have no discussion of these 
issues, which makes the research of little value to the policy maker.  Hands-off 
researchers must leave it to an intermediary between the economic scientist and the 
policy maker to do the translation.  
Hands-on policy analysis is different than the policy done by hands-off applied 
economists. Applied policy economists do work that is more econometrically 
sophisticated, and is written for other economists, not for policy makers. Economists’ 
applied policy is meant to be a contribution to the scientific debate. Hands-on policy 
                                                 
10 As I stated earlier in this paper, my argument is not that that are no problems with academic European 
economics. It is simply to argue that the ranking studies comparing the programs to the United States are 
not a clear demonstration of those problems.  
11 I develop this distinction further in Colander and Nopo (2008).  
  6analysis is designed to contribute directly to the policy debates in a country. Whereas 
hands-off policy analysis concentrates on the scientific aspect of policy, hands-on policy 
applies scientific knowledge to policy by integrating economic knowledge and economic 
models into a broader framework.  
Traditional European programs have given students training in both hands-on and 
hands-off policy analysis, but only the hands off policy analysis has a reasonable outlet in 
the journals. The output of hands-on policy research is affecting policy, not economic 
journal articles. It is not written for other economists; it is written for policy makers and 
its output is useful advice to decision-makers often on a time-dependent topic of 
immediate importance to them. They need an answer in a short time. A “better” answer 
provided later than that time is useless to them. With the adoption of a journal-article 
metric, this hands-off research output, which well may be the most important research 
output of economists, is discouraged. Unless the metrics are adjusted to include this 
hands-on applied research, one of the major strengths of traditional European programs in 
training students to do such research will be undermined.  
The problem becomes cumulative. Individuals who do hands on applied research 
are driven from academic institutions and are replaced by researchers who do hands off 
applied research. They then teach students to do hands-off applied research, even though 
almost all the students’ primary role will be in doing hands-on applied research. Students’ 
training becomes further and further removed from what the majority of them will 
actually be doing, and eventually the expertise in doing hands-on applied research is lost.  
Even within hands-off applied research, quality-weighted journal article metrics 
misses much information about research output, which involves ideas, not articles. 
Because it involves ideas, economists who work in a subject area, or at a school, know 
who is contributing to research and who isn’t regardless of whether or not those people 
publish. The reason is that journal publications are not the way academic researchers 
communicate among themselves. They talk; they e-mail; they listen to seminars; they 
read. In the United States, precisely because of its use of quality-weighted journal article 
biased metrics, most economists who are contributing research to an area publish in 
journals that match the metrics, so the metrics become a better match over time, but it 
takes a long time and there is much noise. For example often what researchers choose to 
publish has to do with many issues quite separate from the quality of their paper. When a 
journal article research metric is used, researchers who game and play the system have an 
advantage over those who simply are interested in doing good work. For traditional 
European programs that have not previously used the metric, the metric is an especially 
poor way of measuring output.  
The lack of correlation between true research output and journal article 
publication is truer today than ever before. Today, in the United States, much of the 
debate about an idea happens at the pre-Working Paper stage, and the research workshops 
at top universities are more central to the spread of ideas in economics today than are 
journals. If you are reading an idea for the first time when it is published in a journal, you 
are out of the informal research loop, and are probably at least two years behind 
specialists’ thinking about the idea. In fact, I would argue that a paper has already had 
  7much of the influence it will have on cutting-edge researchers by the time it reaches the 
Working Paper stage. Publication in a journal is more often than not a tombstone, 
marking ownership of an idea, than it is an important method of communication among 
cutting-edge specialists. Today, were journal publication metrics not used for promotion 
and tenure decisions, many existing print, and even on-line, journals would disappear 
because they would be unnecessary.
12  
The worst effects of the metrics occur in those institutions that have most rigidly 
quantified them. In the United States this happens when there are faculty unions, which 
require carefully classified lists of what counts (and how much it counts) for tenure and 
promotion decisions and what does not. These lists, which can become 40 or 50 pages 
long, and can include weighting factors for the number of words on a page, among 
hundreds of other dimensions, lead to a corollary to Gresham’s Law—bad research drives 
out good research, since faced with such a list rational researchers choose those to 
publish in the “least costly” venue (the journals that require the least work for the highest 
measured gain in the metric) to them; they structure their research agenda accordingly. 
Researchers looking into long-range issues, advanced speculative work, or researchers 
setting off in new directions are selected out of the profession and are replaced by “game 
playing” researchers who are more focused on maximizing output as measured by the 
metric. It is that tendency that leads to the sense that much of what is published is of little 
value.
13  
My problem with the formal rankings being used to measure research is that they 
give zero weights to large numbers of research activities that are central to new ideas 
developing. That zero weighting leads researchers away from these unweighted activities 
and toward weighted activities. It leads rational researchers to focus on small journal-
publishable ideas, and to deemphasize large ideas that might be more interesting, and 
have a larger research payoff. It also leads them to worry less about what their research is 
contributing to knowledge or society, and more to whether it is publishable. The 
publication of the paper becomes an end in itself. That has happened in the United States. 
Essentially, my conclusion of my most recent study of top U.S. graduate economic 
programs (Colander 2006, 2007) is that these graduate programs have become specialists 
at producing highly efficient journal-article writers, but far less proficient at producing 
broad-based research economists and far less proficient at teaching undergraduates.  
The Traditional European Educational Environment and Research Output 
Traditional European programs have been far less influenced by this drive for 
publications. The reason is that until recently, European economists faced a more 
informal, political, and social, incentive systems. Often, the incentive system was vague 
and idiosyncratic by school and country. Thus, Europe avoided the “publication at all 
                                                 
12 I have discussed these issues in Colander and Plum (2004). 
13 In Colander (2007) one of the students expressed this sentiment when he stated, “In a top journal like the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics I’d say at least half[(of the articles published] are useless. Probably 20% 
are useful and the rest are unclear….” Fifty percent will never be cited or read again.” The other students 
in the interview agreed. 
  8costs” bias that characterized the U.S. system.
14 In traditional European economics, doing 
good work, impressing higher-level professors, measures of publications and citations, 
and positively interacting with other professors are all important.
 15 This continues to 
hold widely in traditional European programs even as the system moves into flux. Tono 
Puu (2006) captures this European sensibility in his assessment of publications. He 
writes: “We tend to look down on the previous generation as they published relatively 
little. This fact, however, does not imply that they worked little or were less creative. It 
might just signify that they were more choosy about what they regarded as being 
significant enough to merit publication.”  
Since within the traditional European academic system funding and advancement 
decisions were often made because of social and political factors rather than research 
output factors, there was little push for publication. There was no central job market that 
even implicitly used a journal-publication metric. From what I hear from advocates for 
the journal-article metrics, and from traditional European economists as well, the results 
of this social advancement system were not always a pretty picture. Programs become 
inbred and out of touch with developments that are going on elsewhere. Programs and 
professors often developed fiefdoms, and a small coterie of professors often had control 
over hiring and research of younger professors, who then had no reason to develop an 
independent research program. Connections determined hiring decisions: once hired, 
researchers had limited flexibility. Programs were often focused on narrow issues, and 
many programs made little attempt to subject their ideas to the global economics 
discussion, in part because those discussions were in English, while the work in 
traditional European programs was often in the language of the country in which the 
work was being done.  
The negative aspects of the traditional European programs are generally known 
and underlie the desire for change by almost all European economists; thus I am not 
denying that change is necessary. But when thinking about these changes, the negative 
aspects must be balanced against its positive aspects, and the positive aspects of the 
                                                 
14 The differential assessment system in Europe and the United States is explainable; in the U.S., there has 
long been an integrated labor market; in Europe, there was not, so in Europe there was less need to 
develop a generalized ranking system to compare researchers across borders. An important reason for this 
difference was that, until recently, European economics was fragmented by different languages and 
national borders, and a different promotion system that was based less on publications and more on 
subjective judgments that would develop over time. The smaller markets meant that all top economists in 
a country would meet. They could know one another personally, discuss with each other, and be able to 
come to an independent judgment about each other’s knowledge and work. Assessments based on 
quantitative output measures, such as publications, would matter, but they would be only one small 
element in the subjective judgment. With the development of a common educational policy and a 
common language, that is becoming less the case, and the structure of European economics is now in the 
process of change, albeit slowly.  
15 We present just one example. In Britain, judgments about who was good, not publications, guided 
placements, with this done through established “old boys” networks. This meant, for example, that until 
recently, it was considered unnecessary to get a Ph.D. in order to get a job, and in fact the getting of a 
Ph.D. meant that the researcher was not considered good enough to be hired in the market. As Britain 
integrated its profession with the U.S. profession, that is no longer the case. Indeed, today British 
economics may have become more “American” than American economics, slavishly following outdated 
orthodoxies being abandoned in the United States.  
  9traditional European system compared to the U.S. system, have received too little 
discussion. 
One advantage is that the traditional European system gave researchers a larger 
incentive to think about big questions, and to spend more time reading others’ work, and 
to publish only when they felt they had something meaningful to say that goes beyond 
what others know. Put another way, it directed researchers toward thoughtful research 
over publishable research. This focus on thoughtful research allowed pockets of 
excellence to develop in Europe that could not develop in the United States as European 
researchers took long-term views of research rather than short-term views. For example, 
important work in cointegrated vector auto regression was done at Copenhagen, 
important work in general to specific econometrics was done in England, important work 
in behavioral and experimental economics initially developed in Germany and 
Switzerland, important work in non-linear dynamics and complex systems took place in 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy, and important work in agent based 
modeling was done in Italy. Most of this research reflected a deep understanding of the 
limitations of the current approach in economics, and was foundational work designed to 
change it. Aspects of this work will likely play an important role in the future 
development of economics.
16
A second advantage of the traditional European system is that it left European 
economists free to choose the type of outlet that made most sense for the idea. For 
example, if an idea took a book to make the point, they would write a book rather than 
not deal with the idea because it could not fit into a journal article. Often, ideas weren’t 
published but simply catalogued and used in discussion and classes.  
A third advantage of the European system is that it allowed for more diversity 
than one finds in the U.S. programs. Since there was no single measure in Europe, there 
were many measures of excellence, and different countries specialized in different 
elements. France, with the regulation school, specialized in the integration of social and 
economic issues. Italy specialized in the history of economic ideas. The Netherlands 
specialized in econometric modeling. Some German universities specialized in policy and 
others specialized in the implications of non-linear dynamics for economic systems. The 
“sameness” of graduate programs that the COGEE commission criticized as 
characterizing U.S. graduate programs was far less prevalent in Europe. (Krueger et al. 
1991)   
Despite the push toward a global blending, the most distinctively local heterodox 
traditions have continued to flourish most clearly within the local-language journals and 
outlets. Thus, when I have met European economists from traditional European programs 
I have often been highly impressed with their broad knowledge of the economic 
literature, their technical knowledge, and their sense of what issues are important. In my 
judgment European economics is on a par with US economics, so not only can it 
compete; it is already successfully competing.  
                                                 
16 This argument is developed further in Colander, Holt, and Rosser (forthcoming 2009). 
  10Developing a Better Assessment System  
Let me now turn to the difficult question: how to design an assessment system 
that will weed out the less desirable elements of the traditional European system while 
not destroying the good elements. I premise this discussion on the acceptance that change 
in traditional European academics economics programs is needed, and that the only way 
to implement change is likely to involve the use of some metric that replaces the current 
individually subjective decision-making process. The politics and vested interests are too 
strong to allow the current non-metric-based system work. Moreover, as Europe 
education expands from country-based education to a European education, the subjective 
information about who is good becomes harder to maintain and develop.  
But to say that some metrics will likely be necessary is not to say that the current 
ones being used are the best. Indeed, my arguments suggest that they are far from the 
best, and that they are being used inappropriately. Let me discuss what implications I 
believe my arguments have. 
1.  Begin from a measure of total output, and estimate what percentage of 
total output is being captured by the metric you are using. If the output of 
economists is a complicated and multidimensional as I am arguing it is, 
any metric is going to capture only a small portion of that output. Thus, at 
the beginning of each metric study, the authors should be required by 
editors to estimate the percentage of output that their metric is capturing, 
in order to reduce the possible misuse of that metric. For example, if the 
recent metrics papers had stated in their conclusion that they are capturing 
only a small percentage (my estimate above was 17%) of European 
economists’ total output and that there was no objective way to justify the 
weights they chose, their rankings would likely have not been used in the 
way they have been used.  
2.  Use multiple metrics to judge quality of research. All metrics are flawed, 
and thus one wants to use as many different measures as possible.
17 The 
multiple measures take account of the arbitrariness of any ranking system 
and better capture the multiple dimensions of research. As Zimmerman 
(2008) discusses, REPEC offers numerous alternative measures, which 
gives it a nice flexibility, and includes working papers, measures of access 
on the web, and other such interesting elements. The use of multiple 
metrics will make it easier for subjective evaluation to enter in.  
3.  If you have to choose one metric to focus on, focus on an expansive output 
metric rather than embodying strong implicit and explicit quality weights 
in the metric. In other words, the output metric should be seen as a metric 
measuring only the number of articles with minimal concern for where 
they are published. The reason is two-fold.  
                                                 
17 This argument is nicely developed in Henrekson and Waldenstrom, 2007. 
  11a.  The first reason is that the quality-weighting systems currently in 
use are highly biased against European economists generally. This 
is the case since the existing measures, based upon previous 
importance of journals, are highly U.S.-centric. They rate internal 
U.S. university journals (such as the QJE and JPE) highly, as well 
as rating AEA journals highly. This creates a bias against European 
economists. The problem is that the peer review process cannot be 
totally neutral; geographic or other proximity with the editor 
matters, not because of any conscious bias, but because of 
information flow and interests.
18 Being at the same workshops 
with the editor puts one on the same wavelength and increases 
chances of knowing what the editor is looking for in a paper. 
  Once a journal ranks high in a metric, the rankings become 
self-fulfilling. People send their best papers to the journals that 
rank the highest, and the ranking becomes built into the 
institutional structure. The rankings provide an institutional 
structure that will make it much harder for European journals to 
compete and will be biased against European authors. To offset 
that bias, at least initially, one might even consider in European 
rankings giving European journals be given a higher ranking in 
the metrics for European promotion and advancement. This would 
enhance their ability to attract the best papers. Giving double 
weights for publication in European journals can help offset that 
existing journal bias. It can be seen as a way of generating bottom-
up European journals. I justify it by what might be called an infant 
journal argument. This would encourage Europeans to publish in 
European journals and build them up as an alternative to the 
established U.S. journals.
19  
b.  A second reason is that the quality-weighted systems are highly 
biased against traditional European economics and will likely kill 
off many of the strong aspects of the traditional system as well as 
the weak aspects. As I argued above, strengths of traditional 
European economics include its diversity and its pockets of 
excellence. These strengths have developed precisely because a 
                                                 
18 Journals are subject to real-world influences and to interactions between authors and editors in defining 
what a problem is, and the reasonable way of approaching it are likely to be shared by researchers in the 
same geographic area. JPE articles come  much more heavily from Chicago, and QJE articles come much 
more heavily from Harvard, than from other schools. The editors are at these schools and, even with the 
best of intentions about being open, which I think they have, cannot but be influenced by social 
interactions and discussions about what is relevant and what is not. Decisions on publication are seldom 
clear-cut; reviewers differ, and choice of reviewers can play an important role in whether a paper will be 
accepted. Thus, even in a peer review system the editor has much more influence than is often 
recognized. If Europe moves toward emphasizing a single peer reviewed journal metric, it should develop 
its own European metric that at least initially emphasizes European-based journals (weighing such 
journals much more heavily) to help offset the infant-journal problem.  
19 Obviously, such an alternative weighting system should not continue forever but instead have a planned 
phase out over a ten-year period. 
  12ranking system was not in use, and the use of a highly qualitative 
ranking system will undermine that strength.  
  A broad-based measure—such as Coupe’s (2003) measure 
of output—would be far less damaging, since it would give many 
more outlets to publish. Let me be clear; my argument is not that 
journal quality doesn’t matter, and that a publication in the AER is 
the equivalent to an article in the Journal of Human Resources or 
Public Finance. It is simply to argue that the quality weights are 
article-dependent and context-dependent, and are better made 
subjectively. For example, much of the initial cutting-edge 
research that will guide economics in the future will likely be 
published in non-traditional journals that are more open to new 
approaches; the journal article metrics will miss precisely that 
work that is likely to be most path-breaking.  
  The problem of using quality weights is that they can 
embody significant implicit subjective judgments under the guise 
of objectivity. For example, as Henrekson and Waldenstrom 
(2007) point out, the Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos 
ranking, which was called “the most up-to-date set of objective 
journal weights available” in the introduction to a set of ranking 
studies published in the JEEA (Neary et al. 2003 p. 1247) has 
enormous subjective judgments hidden within it. Specifically, 
those authors point out that “a single article in the American 
Economic Review is valued more highly in the Kalaitzidakis, 
Mamuneas, and Stengos metric than 10 articles in the Journal of 
Financial Economics, or 25 articles in the Journal of Law and 
Economics, 60 articles in the Journal of Health Economics, or all 
the 400+ articles published in the Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics.” (p 5) By hiding those necessarily subjective implicit 
weights in the ranking metric, the subjective judgments are hidden 
rather than made transparent, so one can judge the metric. 
4.  Develop a separate output metric to judge economists’ contribution to 
hands-on research. Hands-on research does not lend itself to journal 
articles, and should not be judged by journal article output. Often, this 
research will result in internal memos. Even when it does result in 
publication, the best publication outlets are not economic journals. Rather 
they include general interest magazines, newspapers, and multidisciplinary 
journals. Any ranking should include some measure of this form of 
research output, or make it clear that it is not capturing this aspect. 
5.  Develop a formal subjective metric to complement and possibly replace 
output metrics. If, as I argued, economics is an informationally small 
activity, then more information exists within the profession than can be 
captured in any metric. Obviously these subjective measures will be 
flawed, but I argue that they will be less so than the alternatives because 
they are more likely to include many non-quantifiable output dimensions 
  13of economists’ performance.
20 There are many ways this formal 
subjection metric could be developed. One could set up a survey sent out 
to specialists in a field who rank other researchers and programs in the 
field in terms of the dimensions that one wants to rank. Weights could be 
assigned to the dimensions, allowing a composite judgment to be arrived 
at.  
  Many variations of this approach are possible. For example, you 
could allow each researcher to write a one-page statement of her or his 
research agenda along with a one-page vita, which others could use to 
rank that research. Programs could provide two-page summaries of their 
research program. Then this information could be provided to all who take 
the survey or to a panel of experts—say U.S. Nobel Prize winning 
economists--who would be asked to rank the schools based on these 
summaries and other knowledge of the program that they have. These 
formal quantified subjective measures could then be used in conjunction 
with the physical measures of output in the more traditional approach.  
6.  Develop an input metric to supplement the output metric. With the 
multidimensionality of research output, with much of it unmeasurable, 
even using multiple dimensions of output metrics, a lot will be missed. 
Essentially, what one wants in research is to have really, really bright and 
creative people, playing with really, really hard questions. Placing any 
type of measure on their output will likely hurt the process. Ideally, these 
really, really bright people should be given wide latitude. The problem is 
that all of us would like to be given that latitude. Thus some filtering 
device must be developed to limit those who are given that latitude. 
Requiring researchers to have Ph.D.s is one way in which that was done. 
That reduces the number of researchers significantly, and insures that they 
have a common core of knowledge. That filter could, and probably should, 
be reconsidered, and additional finer filters should be developed. For 
example, a set of additional difficult certification exams could be 
developed in specific areas, or in techniques, as is done with actuaries. 
Researchers could take these exams and be judged according to their 
knowledge, not their output. Many variations of this approach are 
possible; for example, before one can do research using a particular 
econometric technique, one could be required by a journal to have 
completed a difficult certification exam that demonstrated full knowledge 
of that technique.  
Providing a Level Playing Field for Traditional European Economists 
  I am realistic and I recognize that the above suggestions are unlikely to change the 
current use of metrics, and even if the arguments are accepted, their implementation will 
                                                 
20 One could even establish an on-line virtual economics academy, in which economists who join the on-
line game can create their “dream teams of researchers.” The game could include a trading system that 
would essentially value various economists. Thus a “player” in the virtual academy game would be given 
an objective function and allowed to “draft” and “trade” players for his virtual university.  
  14take many years. In the meantime the current quality-weighted journal-article metrics will 
likely dominate. Thus, even if one accepts none of the suggestions, I still believe that the 
EU should take a number of steps to offset the U.S, bias in the existing quality-weighted 
journal output metrics. 
1.  The EEC should subsidize the distribution of European economic journals. As the 
European Economics Association has discovered, any new economics journal 
today faces serious problems of finding acceptance in libraries. Whereas twenty 
or thirty years ago new journals in economics could easily find homes in libraries, 
new journals today, unless they are part of a large package supplied by a journal 
publisher, have almost no chance of being adopted by libraries.
21 This puts new 
European journals, and existing European journals that are trying to expand their 
readership and global reach, at a considerable disadvantage to established journals 
with built-in library subscriptions. European journals face a strong infant journal 
problem.
22 By emphasizing quality-weighted journal metrics, the EU is 
contributing to that bias and handicapping its own journals. To offset that 
disadvantage, if European economics chooses to give stronger emphasis to a 
journal ranking system, it would pay for the EEC to consider subsidizing existing 
European economic journals for a limited period of perhaps ten years, making 
them available free on the web. This subsidization would allow all libraries in the 
world access to these journals and showcase European researchers’ work, thereby 
helping offset the infant journal problem. Subsidizing all European journals for a 
limited time period would give them a chance to develop and compete on a more 
level playing field. Using European research funds to do this would likely be 
more effective at advancing European economics than would the same funding of 
European research. 
                                                 
21 The AEA journals are some of the most expensive economics journals in the world to produce, both 
because they pay editors well and because they have a labor-intensive quality process of review and 
printing. The average cost of each article is more than $8000 per article. The journals nonetheless have a 
low price to libraries because so many libraries subscribe. It is this advantage that is allowing the AEA to 
introduce four new journals at low prices. These journals will quickly move up in the rankings. The 
reason is twofold. First, economies of scale—the large number of library subscriptions means that the 
AEA can spread out the costs much more than can other journals. (They tied in their four new journals 
that will begin publication in 2009 to existing journals so these will also be relatively inexpensive to 
libraries, since very few will opt out of the total package.) The second reason is that the AEA owns 
EconLit, which provides a major profit (over $1,000,000 a year) to the organization, allowing it to 
heavily subsidize its journals.  
22 As an example of the need for such a program consider the Journal of the European Economic 
Association. It had hoped to become one of the top six journals in the world, but it has not achieved it, not 
because it is of lower quality in its reviewing process, but because it started later, which places it at a 
permanent disadvantage. Its lower rank is recognized by researchers and its lower position becomes self-
fulfilling as the first pass of the best papers are sent to the highest-ranked journals. The problem for new 
journals seeking to move up is amplified by the fact that journals have proliferated, and have become 
very expensive to libraries, meaning that libraries are not buying new journals. The result is that all new 
journals are at a significant competitive disadvantage relative to established journals and even to those 
journals that are part of the private publisher’s package of journals that is sold to libraries as a whole. 
OR—“private publishers’ packages of journals that are…” 
  152.  Establish an invited peer review process for the new European journals. Another 
method that European journals might use to establish their journals as top 
innovative journals rather than as second-tier journals is to institute an “invited 
peer review” section of the journal. For a young scholar, journal publishing is a 
crapshoot—all the more so if the author doesn’t know the editor or at least is not 
familiar with the editor’s thinking. Lack of knowledge about publishing makes it 
difficult for young scholars to take chances. They too often go with papers dotting 
i’s and crossing t’s. 
  To offset that incentive, one can establish a system in which European 
editors choose highly promising young European researchers and invite them to 
publish a paper on a subject in the European journal. This could be competitive in 
the sense that it is judged on a one-page proposal of what is intended. The papers 
are still peer reviewed, but the presumption is that the paper will be published, 
and the writer will have a chance to respond to reviewers. This is essentially how 
some top-ranked U.S. based journals, the JEP and JEL, work, and it allows them 
to get a different range of articles than shows up in other journals. Actually, in 
reality, journals that rely totally on submission also have aspects of these 
invitations since editors sometimes “encourage” economists whose work they find 
interesting to submit papers to their journals. The fact that that happens is one of 
the reasons why the geographic home of a journal matters.  
Conclusion 
  The largest problem of European academic economics is not that it is second rate; 
the problem is that is sees itself as second rate, and acts second-rate by trying to copy 
U.S. programs rather than building on its strengths, and now worrying about how it 
compares to the US programs. Despite all the governance and academic institutions 
problems, which are considerable, its strengths are substantial. It has some of the most 
interesting leading-edge work taking place, and, in certain sub areas has developed 
pockets of excellence that match or exceed anything found in the United States. It has 
strength in diversity that the United States is sorely lacking; and it integrates academics 
into hands-on research much better than does the United States. In many ways, my goal 
in this paper has been a Wizard or Oz role, advising European economics to listen to 
European economists such as Serge-Christophe Kolm (1998), to drop that second-rate 
image of itself, and see its strengths. They should not be like the lion in the Wizard of Oz 
who needs a medal to give it courage. 
So in answer to the question: Can European economics compete with U.S. 
economics?, the answer is yes, absolutely. I have no doubt that Europe can match the 
United States in terms of the journal publication and citation metrics if it changes the 
incentives to do that. But my answer to the second title question: Should they compete? is 
no, at least not in reference to any formal ranking. Just because it can compete does not 
mean that it should do so. Competing in reference to a formal ranking rather than 
competing in ideas, is a tendency of a second rate program. That’s why the metrics of 
competition currently being used will likely do more harm to European economics than it 
will do good. It will put it in a permanently second-tier position as it reduces diversity 
  16and reduces work on cutting-edge ideas that may well become the economics of the 
future.  
What European economics needs most is not a ranking metric, but a change in 
attitude. European economists are so sure they are second, because they are judging 
themselves by U.S.-biased standards, that they develop a second-place mentality. It is 
time for that to end. If Europe is to move to be a leader, it must have faith in itself, and 
develop the mindset of a leader. That means that it must do more than simply import U.S. 
metrics to Europe and design its programs after U.S. programs. They have to build on the 
strengths of the European system, and in reforming those institutions, see themselves as 
leapfrogging the United States, by developing a ranking metric underlying the promotion 
and funding mechanisms that recognizes that subjective judgments about what is good 
and bad must be made. The current changes being implemented will not do that; if 
implemented they will condemn European economics to being a second-tier set of 
programs. European economics, can, and should, do better. 
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